Technical security controls, data handling, and infrastructure design for enterprise security evaluators and vendor risk managers.
Who this is for: CISOs, vendor risk analysts, procurement security reviewers, and GRC teams conducting vendor due diligence. This document maps to standard vendor security questionnaire categories (SIG, CAIQ, VSAQ). No prior SWT3 knowledge required.
SWT3 witness anchors prove that specific operational controls were active at a specific point in time. They do not replace the assessor's independent judgment, professional expertise, or regulatory authority. Assessors must verify that anchored evidence is sufficient, appropriate, and relevant to the specific assessment context. Each regulatory framework retains its own assessment authority, methodology, and determination standards.
TeNova operates the Axiom Sovereign Engine, a platform for the SWT3 AI Witness Protocol. The platform provides independent, cryptographic accountability for AI systems. It is not a security product, not an AI provider, and not a compliance certifier. It is an evidence engine that mints immutable witness anchors proving that governance controls were active at specific points in time.
The core architectural principle: the platform never receives, processes, or stores raw AI inputs or outputs. The SWT3 SDK runs inside the customer's infrastructure, computes SHA-256 hashes and numeric factors locally, and transmits only derived cryptographic evidence to the platform.
SWT3 clearing levels control what data appears in the wire payload transmitted to the platform. The customer selects their clearing level at SDK initialization. Higher levels strip more data before transmission.
| Level | Name | What is Transmitted | What Stays Local |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | Analytics | SHA-256 hashes, numeric factors, model identifier, contextual metadata (provider name, guardrail config) | Raw prompts, raw responses, training data |
| 1 | Standard (default) | SHA-256 hashes, numeric factors, model identifier, contextual metadata | Raw prompts, raw responses, training data |
| 2 | Sensitive | SHA-256 hashes, numeric factors, model identifier only | All contextual metadata, provider name, guardrail names, system fingerprint |
| 3 | Classified | Numeric factors only. Model identifier is hashed before transmission. | All hashes, all metadata, original model identifier |
Certain operational metadata survives all clearing levels by design: agent identifier, lifecycle cycle ID, signing key reference, jurisdiction, legal basis, and purpose class. These are required for regulatory compliance (GDPR, EU AI Act) and cannot be stripped without breaking chain-of-custody guarantees.
| Component | Implementation |
|---|---|
| Compute | US-based data center, dedicated compute instance (not shared hosting). Provider holds SOC 2 Type II certification. |
| Transport encryption | TLS 1.3 (minimum version enforced). HSTS headers enabled. HTTP/2 multiplexing. |
| Firewall | UFW with deny-all-inbound default policy. Allowed: SSH (22, key-only), HTTP (80, redirect to HTTPS), HTTPS (443). |
| SSH access | Key-only authentication. Password authentication disabled. Root login disabled. Idle timeout: 300 seconds. |
| Login banner | DoD-style warning banner displayed before authentication (AC-8). |
| SYN flood protection | TCP SYN cookies enabled (SC-5). |
| Process management | Cluster-mode process manager with automatic restart on failure. Health endpoint monitored at regular intervals. |
| At-rest encryption | AES-256 encryption managed by database provider (Supabase). Application-layer data encrypted at infrastructure level. |
| Role | Permissions | Enforcement |
|---|---|---|
| Admin | Full access: configuration, attestation, exports, key management, user management | Database RLS + middleware |
| Analyst | Read access + attestation. No user management, no key management. | Database RLS + middleware |
| Assessor | Read-only. All POST routes return 403. Cannot access configuration, evidence, or user management. | Database RLS + middleware + API-level enforcement |
Cross-tenant data access is architecturally impossible. The database client wrapper automatically injects the tenant identifier into every query at the client level. The application code cannot construct a query that crosses tenant boundaries. This is not a policy check -- it is a structural constraint in the query builder.
axm_* prefix for identificationPer-tenant token bucket rate limiter applied to witness ingestion endpoints:
| Tier | Requests / second | Burst capacity |
|---|---|---|
| Open | 10 | 10 |
| Pro | 50 | 50 |
| Enclave | 200 | 200 |
| Sovereign | 500 | 500 |
All API errors are sanitized through a central error handler. Non-admin callers receive category-level messages with an AXM-XXXX reference code for incident correlation. Full diagnostic details are restricted to admin sessions. No stack traces, internal paths, or database details are exposed to external callers.
Three endpoints require no authentication by design: anchor verification (client-side SHA-256 recomputation), the DID document (/.well-known/did.json), and the JSON-LD vocabulary context. These are read-only and contain no tenant-specific data.
Every witness anchor includes a deterministic fingerprint computed using SHA-256 with domain separation:
fingerprint = SHA256("WITNESS:{tenant}:{procedure}:{fa}:{fb}:{fc}:{timestamp_ms}").hex()[:12]
WITNESS: prefix prevents collision with other SHA-256 uses in the system| Method | Algorithm | Use Case |
|---|---|---|
| Standard | HMAC-SHA256 | Default for all witness anchors. Shared-secret authentication. |
| Verifiable Credential | Ed25519 (eddsa-jcs-2022) | W3C VC export for Enclave+ tiers. Non-repudiation via public key in DID document. |
Daily per-tenant Merkle tree with domain-separated leaf and node prefixes (SWT3:LEAF: / SWT3:NODE:). Produces a single root hash per tenant per day for batch integrity verification.
Anchor verification runs entirely in the client's browser using the Web Crypto API. The verifier recomputes the SHA-256 fingerprint from the anchor's components and compares it to the stored fingerprint. No server trust is required. The verification page executes no server-side code.
| Severity | Remediation Target |
|---|---|
| CRITICAL | 7 days |
| HIGH | 30 days |
| MEDIUM | 90 days |
Every production deployment passes through two automated gates. Gate failure blocks deployment. There is no override mechanism.
87+ automated checks covering witness pipeline integrity, fingerprint formula correctness, clearing level enforcement, and multi-provider compatibility. Runs after every build, before process restart.
Every gate run is logged with timestamp, git commit hash, pass/fail result, and findings count.
| Provider | Function | Certification | Data Handled |
|---|---|---|---|
| Supabase | Database, authentication, row-level security | SOC 2 Type II | Hashed witness anchors, user accounts, tenant configuration |
| Vultr | Compute infrastructure | SOC 2 Type II | Application runtime, encrypted backups |
| Stripe | Payment processing | PCI DSS Level 1 | Payment methods, billing metadata (no compliance data) |
| Plausible | Privacy-preserving analytics | EU-hosted (Estonia), no cookies | Page views only, no personal data collected |
9 NIST 800-53 controls are inherited from infrastructure providers with documented attribution:
All security-relevant events are logged to an RLS-protected audit table:
Audit logging uses a fire-and-forget pattern: logging failures do not block application operations. Each event includes an AXM-XXXX reference code for correlation.
| Tier | Anchor Retention | Audit Log Retention |
|---|---|---|
| Open | 7 days | 7 days |
| Pro | 90 days | 90 days |
| Enclave | 365 days | 365 days |
| Sovereign | Unlimited | Unlimited |
| Metric | Target | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| RTO | 8 business hours | From incident detection to service restoration (business hours, US Eastern) |
| RPO | 24 hours | Maximum data loss window for application-layer state. Witness anchors in the ledger are not affected. |
| Backups | Daily encrypted | Managed by database provider (Supabase) with point-in-time recovery. 7-day rotation for application-layer backups. |
| Uptime target | 99.5% monthly | Measured from health endpoint. SLA credits apply for Pro and Enclave tiers. |
| Certification | Status | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| SOC 2 Type II (own) | Planned | Evaluating audit firms for independent security review |
| SOC 2 Type II (Supabase) | Inherited | Database and authentication infrastructure |
| SOC 2 Type II (Vultr) | Inherited | Compute infrastructure |
| PCI DSS Level 1 (Stripe) | Inherited | Payment processing. No cardholder data stored by TeNova. |
| NIST 800-53 controls | Self-assessed | 123 controls active, 72 passing, 9 inherited. Continuous deterministic evaluation using the Axiom engine. |
| OSCAL exports | Available | SSP, POA&M, and Assessment Results validated against NIST oscal-cli reference implementation |
| Framework coverage | 36 frameworks | EU AI Act, NIST AI RMF, CMMC, FedRAMP, SR 11-7, ISO 42001, and 30 more via crosswalk engine |
did:web:sovereign.tenova.ioFor security reviewers using standard vendor assessment questionnaires, the following table maps common categories to the relevant sections of this document.
| SIG / CAIQ Category | This Document |
|---|---|
| A. Risk Management | 13. Compliance Status |
| B. Security Policy | 8. Change Management |
| C. Organization of Security | 4. Identity and Access Management |
| D. Asset Management | 2. Data Classification |
| E. Access Control | 4. IAM, 5. API Security |
| F. Cryptography | 6. Cryptographic Design |
| G. Physical Security | 9. Sub-Processors (inherited from Vultr) |
| H. Operations Security | 7. Vulnerability Mgmt, 8. Change Mgmt |
| I. Communications Security | 3. Infrastructure, 6. Cryptographic Design |
| J. Incident Management | 10. Incident Response |
| K. Business Continuity | 12. Business Continuity |
| L. Compliance | 13. Compliance Status |