1. Document Control
| Document Title | Business Continuity Plan (CP-2) |
|---|---|
| Version | 1.0 |
| Effective Date | September 9, 2026 |
| Review Cycle | Annual (next review: September 2027) |
| Classification | Public |
| Owner | Engineering, engineering@tenovaai.com |
| Organization | Tenable Nova LLC |
| NIST 800-53 Reference | CP-2 (Contingency Plan), CP-9 (System Backup), CP-10 (System Recovery and Reconstitution) |
Table of Contents
1. Document Control 2. Purpose and Scope 3. Key Person Risk 4. Recovery Time Objectives 5. Data Classification 6. Backup Strategy 7. Incident Response 8. Succession Plan 9. Contact and Escalation 10. Revision History2. Purpose and Scope
This Business Continuity Plan establishes the policies, procedures, and recovery objectives for Tenable Nova LLC ("TeNova"), the organization responsible for the SWT3 Witness protocol and the Axiom Sovereign Engine platform.
2.1 Scope
This plan covers the following components:
- SWT3 Protocol Specification: The publicly versioned protocol document (SWT3-SPEC) that defines the witness anchor format, fingerprint formula, clearing levels, and cross-language test vectors.
- SDK Ecosystem: Open-source SDKs published across 11 independent package registries (npm, PyPI, crates.io, NuGet, RubyGems, Swift Package Index, and others) in 10 programming languages.
- Witness Ledger: The managed database storing SHA-256 witness anchors, verdict metadata, and daily Merkle rollups for customer tenants.
- Dashboard Platform: The web-based compliance dashboard hosted at sovereign.tenova.io, providing evidence management, reporting, and export capabilities.
2.2 Exclusions
This plan does not cover customer-side implementations of the SWT3 protocol. Organizations that self-host SWT3 SDKs are responsible for their own continuity planning. The protocol specification provides all information necessary for independent implementation.
3. Key Person Risk
TeNova acknowledges the key person risk inherent in an early-stage technology company. This section addresses the concern directly and describes the structural mitigations that reduce this risk to an acceptable level for customers and partners.
3.1 Current Team Structure
TeNova is currently a small, focused team. The founder serves as primary engineer, protocol designer, and business operator. This concentration of knowledge is a recognized risk, and the mitigations below are designed to ensure that no single point of failure can compromise customer data integrity or protocol continuity.
3.2 Structural Mitigations
| Mitigation | Description | Verification |
|---|---|---|
| Published Specification | The SWT3-SPEC is publicly versioned and available on GitHub. Any organization can implement the protocol independently using the published specification alone. | SWT3-SPEC v2.0.0 on GitHub |
| Open Source SDKs | SDKs in 10 languages are published to independent package registries. Once published, registry artifacts are immutable and remain available regardless of the originating organization's status. | npm, PyPI, crates.io, NuGet, RubyGems |
| Locked Fingerprint Formula | The cryptographic fingerprint formula is locked and will not change. The formula is documented in the public specification and verified by published test vectors. | 13 fingerprint + 2 signing + 5 hash test vectors in test-vectors.json |
| Cross-Language Parity | All 10 SDK implementations produce identical fingerprints for identical inputs. This is verified by a shared test vector suite that any third party can run. | 100% parity confirmed across Python, TypeScript, Rust, C#, Ruby, Swift, Go, Kotlin |
| Customer Data Portability | Customer witness anchors are SHA-256 hashes with verdict metadata. All data can be exported in standard JSON format. No proprietary encoding or vendor lock-in applies to the evidence chain. | JSON export via API and dashboard |
| Merkle Rollup Chain | Daily Merkle rollups with RFC 3161 timestamps create a tamper-evident audit trail that remains verifiable using standard cryptographic libraries, with no dependency on TeNova infrastructure. | Daily cron, independent timestamp authorities |
3.3 Risk Assessment
In the event that TeNova ceases operations:
- Existing witness anchors remain valid. SHA-256 hashes do not expire and require no online verification service.
- Published SDKs remain available on independent registries indefinitely.
- The protocol specification enables any qualified engineering team to build a compatible implementation.
- Customer data can be exported in full prior to any service discontinuation, with a minimum 90-day notice period committed in service agreements.
4. Recovery Time Objectives
Recovery Time Objectives (RTOs) and Recovery Point Objectives (RPOs) are defined per component based on criticality and architectural independence.
| Component | RTO | RPO | Rationale |
|---|---|---|---|
| SDK Registries | 0 (zero) | N/A | Published to independent registries (npm, PyPI, crates.io, NuGet, RubyGems). Artifacts are immutable once published. No recovery action required; registries operate independently of TeNova infrastructure. |
| Protocol Specification | 0 (zero) | N/A | Hosted on public GitHub. Repository is distributed by design; any fork contains the complete specification history. |
| Dashboard Platform | 4 hours | 1 hour | Process manager restart from existing deployment, or cloud provider snapshot restore. Application code is in version control; rebuild from source requires no proprietary tooling. |
| Adjudication Engine | 8 hours | 1 hour | Container volume backup and workflow exports stored in version control. Restore involves volume mount and workflow import to a fresh container instance. |
| Witness Ledger | 24 hours | 5 minutes | Managed database with point-in-time recovery (30-day window). Daily Merkle rollups provide an independent tamper-evidence chain that can be verified even during a ledger outage. |
5. Data Classification
5.1 What the Witness Ledger Stores
The SWT3 witness ledger stores cryptographic evidence metadata. It does not store source data. Specifically:
- Stored: SHA-256 fingerprints, verdict outcomes (PASS/FAIL), procedure identifiers, timestamps, tenant identifiers, and factor metadata (numeric values describing the evidence context).
- Never stored: Source code, model weights, training data, prompts, completions, personally identifiable information (PII), protected health information (PHI), or raw compliance evidence.
This design is intentional. The witness protocol records the fact that an event occurred and its compliance outcome, not the content of the event itself.
5.2 Clearing Levels
The SWT3 protocol defines four clearing levels that provide data classification at the protocol layer:
| Level | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| 0 | Analytics | Full metadata retained. Suitable for internal dashboards and trend analysis. |
| 1 | Standard | Default level. Factors and verdict preserved; identifying content reduced. |
| 2 | Sensitive | Factors anonymized. Suitable for cross-organizational sharing. |
| 3 | Classified | Minimal metadata. Verdict and fingerprint only. Suitable for regulatory submission. |
5.3 Tenant Isolation
All customer data is isolated at the database level using tenant-scoped queries with row-level security. No tenant can access another tenant's witness anchors, verdicts, or configuration. Administrative operations that cross tenant boundaries require explicit privileged access and are logged in the audit trail.
6. Backup Strategy
6.1 Infrastructure Backups
| Layer | Method | Frequency | Retention |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cloud Server | Provider automated snapshots | Daily | 7 days |
| Managed Database | Point-in-time recovery | Continuous (WAL) | 30 days |
| Application Code | Git repository (distributed) | Every commit | Full history |
| Workflow Exports | JSON exports in version control | After each change | Full history |
| SDK Artifacts | Published to independent registries | Each release | Permanent (immutable) |
6.2 Tamper Evidence
Daily Merkle rollups compute a single cryptographic root hash over all witness anchors created within each 24-hour period, per tenant. These rollups are timestamped using RFC 3161 timestamp authorities (independent third parties) and stored alongside the ledger data.
This mechanism provides the following guarantees:
- Any modification to a historical witness anchor would invalidate the Merkle root for that day, producing detectable evidence of tampering.
- RFC 3161 timestamps prove the rollup existed at a specific point in time, independent of TeNova systems.
- Merkle proofs can be verified using standard SHA-256 libraries with no dependency on TeNova software.
6.3 Source of Truth Hierarchy
- Git repository is the authoritative source for application code, protocol specification, and configuration.
- Managed database is the authoritative source for customer witness data and tenant configuration.
- Package registries are the authoritative distribution channel for SDK artifacts.
- RFC 3161 timestamps provide independent proof of existence for daily Merkle rollups.
7. Incident Response
7.1 Severity Levels
| Severity | Definition | Response Target | Example |
|---|---|---|---|
| P1 / Critical | Complete service outage or confirmed data breach affecting customer witness data | Acknowledge within 1 hour; restore within 4 hours | Database unavailable; unauthorized access to ledger |
| P2 / High | Partial service degradation affecting witness ingestion or dashboard access | Acknowledge within 4 hours; restore within 8 hours | Ingestion endpoint returning errors; dashboard login failures |
| P3 / Medium | Non-critical feature unavailable; workaround exists | Acknowledge within 8 hours; resolve within 48 hours | Export function degraded; non-blocking UI issue |
| P4 / Low | Cosmetic issue or minor inconvenience with no compliance impact | Acknowledge within 24 hours; resolve in next release cycle | Formatting inconsistency; documentation correction |
7.2 Communication Channels
- Incident notification: Affected customers are notified via email to their registered contact address.
- Status updates: Updates are provided at a minimum of every 2 hours during P1 incidents and every 4 hours during P2 incidents.
- Engineering contact: engineering@tenovaai.com
- Support contact: support@tenovaai.com
7.3 Post-Incident Review
A post-incident review is conducted within 72 hours of resolution for all P1 and P2 incidents. The review covers:
- Root cause analysis
- Timeline of detection, response, and resolution
- Customer impact assessment
- Corrective actions and preventive measures
- Updates to this BCP if the incident exposed a gap
Post-incident review summaries are shared with affected customers upon request.
8. Succession Plan
The succession plan addresses the scenario in which key personnel are unavailable for an extended period or the organization ceases operations.
8.1 Protocol Continuity
- The SWT3-SPEC (currently v2.0.0) is publicly available and contains the complete protocol definition, including anchor format, fingerprint formula, clearing level rules, and verification procedures.
- Published test vectors (13 fingerprint, 2 signing, 5 hash) enable any engineering team to verify their implementation produces correct outputs without access to TeNova source code or personnel.
- Cross-language parity has been verified across all 10 SDK implementations. This verification is reproducible by any third party using the published test vector suite.
8.2 Customer Data Continuity
- All customer witness data can be exported via the dashboard or API at any time in standard JSON format.
- Merkle proof chains remain cryptographically valid regardless of platform availability. Any standard SHA-256 implementation can verify a Merkle proof exported from the platform.
- RFC 3161 timestamps on daily rollups provide court-admissible proof of existence that does not depend on TeNova as a witness.
8.3 Code and Artifact Preservation
- SDK source code is hosted on public GitHub under the
tenova-labsorganization. GitHub's terms of service preserve public repositories even if the owning organization becomes inactive. - Published packages on npm, PyPI, crates.io, NuGet, and RubyGems are immutable once published. These registries are operated by independent organizations (npm Inc., Python Software Foundation, Mozilla, Microsoft, RubyGems.org) and are not affected by TeNova's operational status.
- The protocol specification is versioned in Git. Any fork of the repository contains the complete specification and its revision history.
8.4 Planned Growth
As TeNova grows, this plan will be updated to reflect:
- Additional engineering team members with documented runbook access
- Formal escrow arrangements for enterprise and sovereign-tier customers
- Designated succession contacts with legal authority to manage customer transitions
- Multi-region infrastructure redundancy
9. Contact and Escalation
| Purpose | Contact |
|---|---|
| Engineering and incident response | engineering@tenovaai.com |
| General support and account inquiries | support@tenovaai.com |
| Security vulnerability disclosure | engineering@tenovaai.com (subject: SECURITY) |
| Data export and portability requests | support@tenovaai.com |
10. Revision History
| Version | Date | Description |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0 | September 9, 2026 | Initial publication. Covers protocol, SDK, ledger, and platform continuity. |